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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is established under §78-2-2 (3) (f) Utah Code Ann.
(1953 as amended) which gives the Supreme Cc^urt jurisdiction to
review all final orders and decrees of the district court.

This

case is subject to assignment to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAIf
Appellants have

stated

nine

issues on appeal which

these

Appellees believe can be succinctly summarized as follows:
1.

WHETHER

THE

TRIAL

COURT

ERRED

Itf HOLDING

THAT

THE

SEPTEMBER 1987 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DID NOT RELEASE OTHERWISE VALID
LIENS SECURING UNPAID NOTES, EITHER BY CONTRACT INTERPRETATION OR
BY OPERATION OF LAW.
This question represents a mixed questibn of fact and law.
Insofar as the question involves the intent of the parties to
preserve the lien on the property,
Therefore, whether based

it is $ question of fact.

on oral or documentary

evidence, the

finding will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous.
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)

(as amended, effective January 1,

1987);

Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinsoq, 782 P.2d 487 (Utah
1989) .
Insofar as the question is one of law

involving

contract

interpretation and the operation of law, the appropriate standard
of review is no particular deference, but the Lower court decision
should be reviewed for its correctness.
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Ut. 1985).

Scha^rf v. BMG Corp., 700

2.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS VALUATION OF CERTAIN

PROPERTIES.
This

issue presents

a question

of

fact; therefore, the

standard of review is whether the lower court's ruling was clearly
erroneous.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Appellants
"Overthrust")

Overthrust

and

Oil

and

Faust Land, Inc.

Gas

Company

(hereinafter

(hereinafter

"Faust") are

appealing a decision of the Third Judicial District Court allowing
the judicial foreclosure of a Trust Deed covering undeveloped
acreage in Tooele County, Utah.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
A non-jury trial was held before the Honorable Homer

F.

Wilkinson on Thursday, August 31, 1989, in Tooele, Utah.
Subsequent to the trial, the District Court made Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law which were executed by the Court on
October 23, 1989. In its decision, the Court ruled in Plaintiffs1
favor,

holding

that

Plaintiffs

may

proceed

with

a

judicial

foreclosure of the Tooele County property which is the subject of
this case.
The Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law delayed
for future determination the issue of the amount of "boot" to be
credited to the Promissory Note which is the subject of this
action. A heeiring was held on Monday, November 13, 1989, wherein
the Court considered this issue and subsequently considered a
proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Counsel for Defendants Overthrust "and Faust objected to the same.
2

A hearing on the objections was held by the Court on February 8,
1990.
Pursuant to such hearing, the District Cc>urt made Superseding
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law whiich were intended to
supersede

all

previous

Findings

and

Conclusions.

In

the

Superseding Findings of Fact and Conclusion^ of Law, the Court
found (1) the promissory note which was secured by a Trust Deed
from Overthrust was unsatisfied, (2) an amount Df $1,152,115.50 was
still owed thereon after application of all appropriate credits,
and (3) the Trust Deed had not been released.

The Court therefore

ordered foreclosure.
No Defendants posted any Supersedeas Bond.

As a result, the

foreclosure sale was completed on August 14, 1990.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTJS
1.

In

1987, three

large

loans owing

to

Zions

Bank

and

cumulating over seven million dollars went iifto default (R. 433).
The loans were secured primarily by various parcels of real estate
in Summit, Salt Lake and Tooele Counties (C0urt Finding of Fact
Nos.

1-4, 8; R.

435-434, 433).

Appellee

4447 Associates had

earlier acquired an interest in the notes with Zions Bank (Court
Finding of Fact No. 9; R. 433).
2.

The bank engaged in extensive settlement negotiations

with the obligors on the notes
R. 433).
resulted

(Court Finding of Fact No. 11;

A written Settlement Agreement of September 30, 1987,
from such discussions

(Court Finding

R. 433).

3

of Fact No. 12;

3.

The obligors of the notes, realizing that substantial

deficiency judgments would result following foreclosure of the
collateral, agreed to the following:
a.

to allow Zions Bank to complete foreclosures of the

real estate, (Court Finding of Fact No. 12; R. 433); and
b.

to contribute certain other assets ("boot") to the

bank in exchange for the bank's agreement to release the
obligors from further personal liability on the notes. (Court
Finding of Fact Nos. 12, 14(a) - (3); R. 433, 432).
4.

Appellants Overthrust and Faust Land Inc. were not makers

on the notes (Court Finding of Fact No. 5; R. 4 34) but claimed some
ownership to approximately 3,500 acres of undeveloped real property
located in Tooele County, which property was pledged as collateral
on one of the loans in default with the bank. Appellant Faust Land
Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Appellant Overthrust (Court
Finding of Fact Nos. 4, 10; R. 434, 433).
5.

Overthrust and Faust Land Inc., while not direct parties

to the September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement (Court Finding of
Fact No. 13; R. 432) , actively participated through their President
in the settlement negotiations

(Court Finding of Fact No. 15;

R. 431), knew the consequences of the decisions reached (Court
Finding of Fact No. 15; R. 431), never objected to the same, and
cooperated in effectuating the terms of the Settlement Agreement
(Court Finding of Fact Nos. 15, 17, 18; R. 431).

In addition,

ownership of Overthrust and other entities who were parties to the
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement was substantially similar
(Court Finding of Fact No. 6; R. 434-433).

6.

Following

the execution of the Settlement Agreement,

Zions Bank and the note obligors began to complete the terms
thereof.
the

bank

The "boot" assets were delivered to the bank in trust and
began

finalizing

securing the notes.
7.

the

foreclosure^

of

the

collateral

(R. 481, pages 236, 207+-208.)

Much of the collateral was foreclosed pursuant to sales

in the Utah Bankruptcy Court which were ordered pursuant to the
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement.
8.

(R. 481, page 236).

The final parcel of property to be foreclosed pursuant to

the September 1987 Settlement Agreement was t|he 3 500 acres located
in

Tooele

County

to

which

Appellants

claimed

some

interest.

(R. 481, page 236)
9.

Pursuant to the September 30, 1987, (Settlement Agreement,

the President of Overthrust verbally agreed to execute a deed in
lieu of foreclosure to the bank.

(Court Finding of Fact No. 17;

R. 431). Subsequently, he suggested a "friendly foreclosure" would
be preferable, with the intent that Overthrust would not contest
the same (Court Finding of Fact No. 18; R. 4j31) .

Pursuant to its

reservation of right in the September 1987 Settlement Agreement,
the bank then initiated the instant action to judicially foreclose
its trust deed lien on the Tooele collateral.

(Court Conclusion of

Law No. 3; R. 428).
10.

Contrary

to

the

representations

of

its

President,

Overthrust (and Faust Land Inc.) then contested the appropriateness
of the action, claiming:
a.

That

despite

its

reservation

of

rights

in

the

Settlement Agreement, the release of liability to the obligors

5

somehow

satisfied

the

note

and

extinguished

the

Tooele

collateral.
b.

Alternatively, the amounts received on foreclosure

of collateral securing the other notes, when added to the
"boot" received by the bank, have in effect "overpaid" the
note in question and thereby satisfied the same.

The Tooele

collateral, it is claimed, should thereby be released from its
lien to the bank.

No claim is apparently asserted that the

trust deed was invalid and hadn't been a lien on the property,
but only that it is no longer enforceable.
11.

At trial, the Court held that:
a.

The release of liability to the note obligors did

not release the collateral from the valid bank lien.

The bank

had reserved its rights to complete the foreclosures under the
September 1987 Settlement Agreement.

(Court Conclusion of Law

Nos. 9, 17; R. 427, 425).
b.

That after application of all appropriate credits

(including "boot") to the note secured by the Tooele property,
the balance owing on such note was $1,152,115.50 at the time
of trial (Court Conclusion of Law No. 14; R. 426).
c.

That foreclosure be completed (Court Conclusion of

Law Nos. 9, 21, 22; R. 427, 425).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement did not "satisfy"
the three delinquent notes owed to Zions Bank, nor did it release
valid liens against collateral securing the notes.
Agreement

simply

released

obligors

6

of

the

notes

The Settlement
from

further

liability thereon, all while explicitly reserving the bankfs right
to foreclose on such collateral.
The trial court, as finder of fact, cporrectly valued all
relevant property and still determined that tt^e Tooele property was
subject to a note with an unpaid balance of $1,152,115.50.
The provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, by its
very terms, do not apply to a transaction involving the foreclosure
of real estate. Even if such provisions didftpply,Overthrust was
not an accommodation party.
The
followed,

one-action
in

the

rule

was

not violated,

foreclosures

completed

but

instead

pursuant

to

was
the

September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement.
Contrary to the assertions of Appellants! that the bank should
have tried to "rescind" the September 30, 1^87, Agreement if the
bank wasn't happy with its terms, the bank has never wanted to
rescind the agreement.

All the bank wants i|s what the agreement

provides—nothing more and nothing less. The Settlement Agreement
provided for the bank to complete its foreclosure of the Tooele
property.

That

is what the bank did.

The district court

considered Appellant's arguments and rejectee^ the same.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE SEPTEMBER 30, 1987, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS VALID AND DID
NOT "SATISFY" NOR "EXTINGUISH" THE UNPAID PROMISSORY NOTES,
A.

Intent of Settlement Agreement Itself.

Appellants argue that by releasing the obligors from further
liability on the notes, there is no more ijiote.

7

Consequently,

Appellants

argue, the collateral

securing

the notes must be

released.
Such recisoning

is contrary to the express terms of the

September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement,
The Settlement Agreement did not "satisfy" nor "extinguish"
the unpaid notes.

Such words are not found in the agreement.

Instead, the intent and language of the agreement was to release
contingent personal liability of the note obligors while expressly
reserving the right to foreclose the collateral securing the notes.
The agreement states:
"Upon the transfer and recordation of the documents
required herein, . . . Lenders specifically
acknowledge that Borrowers' and Christenson's
personal obligations under such Loans will be
terminated and Lenders1 sole remedy shall be
against the real properties which are the subject
of this Agreement."
Settlement

Agreement,

Appellants1 Brief).

page

8

(First

Exhibit

to

Addendum

to

If the parties had intended to "satisfy" the

notes, they would not have reserved the right to liquidate the
collateral.
Finally,
pursuant

to

Appellants
the

never

Settlement

allege

Agreement

the
were

other

foreclosures

invalid—instead,

Appellants rely upon such sales to argue the notes were overpaid.
It is inconsistent to argue that the 1987 Settlement Agreement
satisfied notes and released all collateral, while next arguing
that all resulting foreclosures were valid but the one affecting
the Tooele property.
It is obvious that the 1987 Settlement Agreement did not
satisfy the unpaid notes, nor extinguish the collateral security to
the same.

B.

Validity of Settlement Agreement.

It is unclear from Appellant's brief whether the validity of
the Settlement Agreement is being challenged.

Its validity was

never challenged in the district court; therefore, it may not be
challenged now.

Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P|.2d 938

Appellees Zions Bank and 4447 Associates 4°

not

(Ut. 1987).

challenge the

validity of the Agreement, but only want th0 terms therein to be
completed.
Appellant's brief appears to challenge the validity of the
Settlement Agreement for the reason that foreclosure of the Tooele
property was not possible in the Bankruptcy C|ourt at the same time
as the other properties.

This was not possible because the

Bankruptcy

have

property.

Court

did

not

jurisdiction

over

the

Tooele

(R. 431, R. 481, pages 234-235) . Hjowever the Settlement

Agreement contemplated such a situation and provided that if an
order of sale from the Bankruptcy Court was hot possible then the
property

would

be

foreclosed

under

the

laws

of

the state.

(Settlement Agreement, See first Exhibit to Addendum to Appellants1
Brief, page 8.)

Therefore, all parties hav^ been able to comply

fully with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
C.

Validity of Trust Deed Itself.

It is also unclear from Appellant's briei} whether the validity
of the trust deed

is being challenged.

Because it was not

challenged in the district court, it may not be challenged now.
Mascaro, 741 P. 2d 938. However, should it be found to be an issue,
the following general rules are relevant and validate the Trust
Deed.

9

A mortgage is a contract and as such it is governed by the
same

laws

Therefore,

which

apply

to

the

interpretation

of

contracts.

fl

[t]he consideration required to sustain a mortgage is

the same as that required to sustain a simple contract, and may
consist of either a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the
promisor." Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, Inc., 514
P.2d 594, 598 (Id. 1973);
1964).

Abraham v. Abraham. 394 P.2d 385 (Ut.

In Surety Life, the court held that a mortgage was valid

even though the mortgagor did not receive the consideration.

In

Seattle-First Nat. Bank, v. Hart, 573 P.2d 827, 829 (Wa.App. 1978),
the Court found a co-owner's interest in real property could be
foreclosed even though it didn't sign the note because it did sign
the mortgage.
In order to have a valid trust deed no particular form is
necessary,

but

there must

be

in existence

obligation with a specific amount owing.
Mast Const. Co.,

a

legal

debt

or

General Glass Corp. v.

766 P.2d 429, 432 (Ut.App. 1988).

Further, the debt need not be for any consequential amount,
there need only be some debt.

In American Savings and Loan Ass'n

v. Blomauist, 445 P.2d 1, 4 (Ut. 1968),

a tender of $147 was found

insufficient to defeat foreclosure when the amount of indebtedness,
as determined by the court because there was a dispute, was $149.
Id.
In the present case, the Trust Deed is valid because it was
supported by adequate consideration (R. 434-433) and it correctly
identified the debt which it was intended to secure (R. 428) . The
district court found that even after all the pledged security and
a percentage of the "boot" were applied to the balance of the
10

Promissory Note it was still unsatisfied and in default.

(R. 426,

430) .
II.

THE RELEASE OF THE OBLIGORS FROM FURTHER [PERSONAL LIABILITY ON
THE NOTES DID NOT "RELEASE" THE VALID COLLATERAL SECURING THE
NOTES.
A.

The Parties to the Settlement Agreement Specifically
Reserved Their Rights Against the Collateral.

It is a long-standing rule of law that "[t]he debt and the
mortgagor's liability for it are not the same thing in law.
the mortgage

is not discharged

Hence

if it is tjhe intention of the

parties merely to release the mortgagor's pergonal liability for it
and not to extinguish the debt."
Also,

"[i]t

is not necessary

59 C.J.S. Mortgages, §444 (1983).
that there should

be a personal

liability of the mortgagor in order for therle to be a mortgage."
Seattle First,

573 P.2d at 828-29 and "a mortgage may secure the

debt of another without the mortgagor assuming personal liability
for the debt."

Gallager v. Central Indiana $ank N.A., 448 N.E.2d

304, 308 (Ind. 1983).
Non-recourse loans secured by real estate are common on Utah.
Further, note obligors are often discharged in bankruptcy without
releasing collateral securing the "discharged" obligation.
1987 Settlement Agreement merely accomplishes the same result.
released

the obligors of various notes

frc^m further

The
It

liability

without releasing the collateral—in effect, leaking the notes "nonrecourse" .
An

express

reservation

of

a

right

t£> foreclose

against

property which secures a debt while releasing an individual of
personal liability is valid and enforceable in Utah because the
note is independent from the underlying debt.. Utah Farm Production
11

Credit Ass'n v. Watts, 737 P.2d
intention
personal

in any case
liability

is

154

(Ut. 1987).

"Whether the

is to discharge the debt or merely

the

a

the

question

of

fact,

depending

on

circumstances of the case or the construction of the release."
Korb v, Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. , 3 P.2d
1931).

502, 505 (Kan.

In Grand Rapids Gypsum Co. v. Carter, 302 F.Supp. (E.D.N.Y.

1969) the court found evidence that a general release was not
intended to release a mortgage and therefore, in spite of the
general

wording

of

the

release

only

the mortgagor's

personal

liability was released.
Even if an old note is replaced with a new note or agreement,
this

does

not

affect

the

security.

Jones

v.

American

Coin

Portfolios, Inc.f 709 P. 2d 303 (Ut. 1985) . In Jones the parties to
a note entered into a new agreement and the mortgagor argued that
this extinguished the first note and hence the mortgage.

However,

the court found that the evidence indicated that the parties never
intended to extinguish the mortgage because the original note was
attached

as

an

exhibit

to

the

new

agreement

and

because

the

indebtedness represented by the original Trust Deed Note or the
amended Trust Deed Note had never been extinguished.

Jones v.

American Coin, 709 P.2d at 306-307.
In the case at bar, a Trust Deed was given to secure a third
party's indebtedness on a note.

(R. 4 34)

The parties to the

original note subsequently entered into a new agreement in which
the debtors were released from personal liability upon the note.
However, in the agreement, Zions expressly stated that the release
was only of the debtor's personal liability on the notes and all
rights against the property which secured the note were expressly
12

reserved.

(R. 433-432, R. 425) Additionally|, the Promissory Note

has never been returned or marked "paid".

(R. 481, page 13).

Because the original debt has never been satisfied (R. 426), and
the intent of the parties was to only release the debtor's of their
personal liability on the Promissory Note, j(R. 425) the district
court

correctly

determined

that

Appellees

were

entitled

to

foreclose the Trust Deed.
B.

The Collateral Securing the Notesj Was Not Released by
Operation of Law.
1.

Because there has been no violation of Section
78-37-1 U.C.A.
The trial court properly found
foreclosure to be appropriate.

Section 78-37-1 U.C.A. has been termed the "one-action
rule."

It provides that:
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or
the enforcement of any right securjed solely by mortgage
upon real estate which action must be in accordance with
the provisions of this chapter.

In Utah Mortgage and Loan Co. v. Bla^k, 618 P.2d 43 (Ut.
1980), the court explains:
The purpose of the statute was to eliminate harassment of
debtors and multiple litigation which sometimes occurred
under the common-law rule which allowed a creditor to
foreclose and sell the land and to sue on the note. The
statute limits the creditor to one remedy in exhausting
his security before having recourse to the debtor for a
deficiency.
Consequently, if the creditor fails to
comply with the statute in not applying the security to
the defendants obligation in accordance with their
agreement, that would preclude its recovery of any
deficiency against them.
Id. at 45.
Appellants assert that the one-action rjule has been violated
in this case.

The reasoning for such assertion is unclear from

Appellantsf brief.
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Appellees do not seek any secondary action for deficiency
judgment against any of the obligors under any of the notes.

The

only relief sought was a foreclosure of the real estate pledged on
the various notes•

All foreclosures were effectuated under a

common plan pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
It is also unclear how Appellants have been damaged by the
process of liquidation of all collateral pledged on the notes. The
one-action ruLe requires a creditor to exhaust a security prior to
seeking a personal judgment against an obligor.

Such result is

exactly the situation which occurred as required by statute.

No

deficiency is sought against any party.
2.

The district court correctly determined that
Overthrust was not an accommodation party and that
Section 70A-3-606 U.C.A. did not apply.

Appellees Zions Bank and 4447 Associates
argument

incorporate the

in the brief of Appellee Richard A. Christenson by

reference.
In addition, the legislature as well as the courts have
expressly

stated

that Utah's Uniform

Commercial

Code

is not

applicable "to the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien
on real estate ..." Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 460
(Ut. 1983) (quoting from §70A-9-104(j) U.C.A.) (Court refused to
apply unconscionability section from Utah's Uniform Commercial Code
to a Trust Deed).

Therefore, Overthrust's arguments relating to

accommodation parties are irrelevant.
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III. BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S VALUATION £|ND APPLICATION OF THE
PROMISSORY NOTE'S SECURITY WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, ON
REVIEW IT MUST STAND AND FORECLOSURE WAS THEREFORE
APPROPRIATE.
A.

In General.

The district court listened to testimony and the issues were
extensively argued and briefed by counsel forj both parties. While
another court may have valued the property differently, there is
evidence to support the findings of the distnict court, and it was
definitely within the discretion of the distrtict court to make the
findings of fact which were made.

A finding is clearly erroneous

only if it is against the great weight of evidence or

if the court

is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has
been made.

Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 117£ (Ut. 1989).

Additionally, in an attack on the evidenlce by appellants, the
appellate court should begin its analysis w|th the trial court's
findings of fact, not with an appellant's view of the way he or she
believes that facts should have been found.
P.2d

147

(Ut. 1987).

Ashton v. Ashton, 733

In order to challenge a trial court's

findings of fact, an appellant must first mar^hall all the evidence
that supports the findings and then demonstrate that, despite this
evidence, they are so lacking in support a$ to be "against the
clear weight of the evidence" and, thus, clealrly erroneous.

In re

Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Ut. 19$9).
B.

Valuation of Overthrust Stock.

The only valuation issue specifically attacked by Appellants
is whether the district court clearly erred iji valuing one million
(1,000,000) shares of Overthrust stock at $2$0,000.00.

At trial,

George Woodhead, President of Appellant Overthrust, gave testimony
15

that the shares were worth two and one half {2\)
$250,000).

cents each (or

(R. 481, pages 149-152, 162). Additionally at trial,

an Option to Purchase between Zions and Overthrust was presented as
evidence of the value of Overthrust stock.

Under the Option to

Purchase agreement, Zions was granted the option to purchase
Overthrust stock at ten (10) cents per share.

Testimony was also

given wherein the value of Overthrust stock was shown to be
substantially less than two and one half (2h) cents per share. (R.
481, pages 123, 209-220) . Because the value of the stock was hotly
contested, it was clearly within the discretion of the district
court to rule that the testimony

given by George Woodhead

(President of Appellant Overthrust) was the best valuation possible
of the stock under the circumstances.
C.
To

Application of Credits Due to the Note.
reach

the

conclusion

that

the

note

was

unpaid

and

foreclosure was appropriate, the district court credited the value
of

all

security

Promissory Note.

which

had

specifically

(R. 427-426).

been

pledged

to the

In addition, the district court

applied, on a pro-rata basis, the value of certain other security
("boot") which Zions was to receive from the Settlement Agreement
of September 30, 1987.

(R. 427-426). Even after all these credits

were accounted for, the Promissory Note was still unsatisfied
(R. 426), with an unpaid balance of $1,152,115.50.

Therefore,

foreclosure of the Tooele property was appropriate.
Appellants1 brief seeks to complicate the district court's
ruling by engaging in an analysis of speculative values of all
property pledged on other notes as well as the "boot11 received by
Appellants

pursuant

to

the

September

30,

1987,

Settlement

Agreement.

It also raises valuations of property never raised in

the district court and first raised in Appellant's brief.
Evidence and new arguments may not be submitted for the first
time on appeal, particularly when the problem could have been
resolved by the court below.
1987).

Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Ut.

However, on appeal Overthrust has added credits and made

arguments for which no evidence was presented at trial. On appeal,
Overthrust argues that no debt is owed to Ziojns and as support has
compiled

a table wherein credits are allocated to Zions for

security

allegedly

received

(Overthrust's Brief, page 29).
at trial concerning several

under

the

Settlement

Agreement.

However, no evidence was presented
of the credits;

therefore,

the

district court made no findings on these ite^ns. Overthrust gives
a credit of $620,000.00 to Zions-4447 for £ "Redwood Road Rear
Utility Access".

There is no evidence concerning

this item

anywhere in the record. Also, $1,422,291.00 is credited to Zions4447 for "Reverse of Interest Charges".

Th^ argument supporting

this credit was not presented at trial, nor Is there any evidence
that this credit was ever presented to the district court for a
decision on whether it would be allowed. Any cite to the record is
wholly

inadequate

and

inappropriate

to

explain

Overthrustfs

assertion that it is entitled to a $1,422|, 491.00 credit.

In

addition to being unsupported by the evidence, the portion of the
table contained on page 29 of Overthrust!s B^ief which summarizes
alleged credits to Zions-4447 is irrelevant to the issue in this
case; namely, whether the Promissory Note secured by the Tooele
property was satisfied.

Because these assertions were never

presented to the district court for consideration, they may not be
17

considered now.

As a result, the findings of the District Court

must stand.
Additionally, it was within the sound discretion of the
district court to allow a credit to the Promissory Note on a prorata basis. In Clovis National Bank v. Harmon, 692 P.2d 1315, 1318
(N.M. 1984) , a note was secured by two mortgages and the court
ruled that the note should be satisfied proratably from the sale of
the mortgaged property.

The reviewing court explained that if the

parties had intended the property to secure only certain notes or
loans, it could have stated that intent.

Because the parties did

not, the district court refused to do so.
CONCLUSION
The Settlement Agreement of September 30, 1987 was valid,
enforceable and all its terms and conditions may be complied with.
The Promissory Note, which was secured by a Trust Deed executed by
Overthrust, has never been satisfied, nor has the Trust Deed been
released.

As a result, foreclosure of the Tooele property was

properly ordered by the district court.
Zions Bank and 4447 Associates want no more, and no less, than
the Settlement Agreement allows.

The district court's ruling

accomplishes such a result and should be upheld.
DATED this

nl*~ day of January, 1991.
'^
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS

J. I

WUK/

Jruce J. Nelson
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Cross-Claim Respondents
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